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BOOK REVIEWS 459 
Reason, Relativism, and God, by Joseph Runzo. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1986. Pp. xvii and 290. Cloth, $29.95. 
THOMAS F. TRACY, Bates College. 
Joseph Runzo has written a provocative book on an important topic. The central 
question addressed by this ambitious study is whether "an absolute religious faith 
stance is compatible with the notion that truth is relative" (p. xiii). Runzo sets out 
to show, first, that the religious believer can and should accept a certain kind of 
relativism about both what is true and what is real, and second, that this need not 
lead to a general skepticism about the noetic value of our network of beliefs. The 
"absoluteness" that Runzo seeks to preserve for faith is, as one would expect, an 
absoluteness of commitment and not of content. The central tenets of the Christian 
faith have their truth within a conceptual schema which is one among many equally 
adequate constructions of a world. By virtue, however, of the crucial role played 
by these beliefs within that schema, the Christian will treat them as though they 
were absolute truths. 
I will focus, given the limits of space, on Runzo's treatment of relativism and 
skepticism, rather than on his comments about the absoluteness of faith. His dis-
cussion opens with a brief account of cultural-historical relativity in various dis-
ciplines of inquiry, with particular emphasis on the theological significance of 
religious pluralism. The "diversity principle of religious relativism" claims that 
because religions are social constructions that reflect the cultural traditions within 
which they arise, they are often incompatible with one another. This alone, how-
ever, does not constitute a philosophically interesting relativism. A second, 
stronger claim is made by the "dependency principle of religious relativism," viz., 
that the truth of any religious belief depends at least in part on the "patterns of 
thought" of the religious community which holds that belief (pp. 12-13). 
This religious relativism is an instance of a more general relativism which 
maintains "that truth is relative to conceptual schemas (or 'systems of ideas'), 
that what is real and unreal is relative to conceptual schemas, and that there are 
many, equally expedient schemas for understanding 'the world'" (p. 3 I). The 
first of these clauses immediately needs qualification in order to meet one of the 
standard objections to relativism: viz., that it is either self-stultifying (by virtue 
of its self-application) or self-contradictory (by denying of itself what it asserts 
of all statements that bear a truth value). Runzo's solution to this problem is to 
restrict the scope of the statements to which the relativistic principle applies. 
"First order" statements in an object language (i.e., statements about objects, 
events, states of affairs) will be true or false only within a particular conceptual 
schema. But at least sorrie "second order" statements about the object language 
will be true, if they are true at all, of every conceptual schema. Conceptual 
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relativism, then, asserts that first order statements bear a truth value relative to 
a conceptual schema. This principle, however, is itself a second order statement 
that is asserted to hold for every conceptual schema, and so it is an "absolute 
truth" (p. 46). 
Anticipating a move to relativize second-order statements, Runzo introduces 
the notion of third order statements, i.e., statements about second-order state-
ments. He insists that these cannot have a truth value "for truth and falsity are 
determined by the internal conceptual structure of schemas, and third-order 
statements are expressed in terms of their applicability across schemas" (p. 47). 
If the principle here is that no statement which is asserted to apply across schemas 
can have a truth value, then Runzo's position is in serious trouble. For in this 
case, absolute truths (like the principle of conceptual relativism itself) cannot be 
true or false-an odd result. This confusion results from mixing together two 
different questions in the discussion ofthird-order statements. Runzo asks whether 
we can assess the truth value of conceptual schemas as a whole. In response, 
he plausibly argues that conceptual schemas themselves cannot be either true or 
false. This should be distinguished, however, from the question of whether a 
statement can be true in (or of) all schemas. This is a possibility that Runzo 
must affirm if he is to avoid the standard objection to relativism. 
It is of central importance to note that both truth and "reality" are relative to 
conceptual schemas. To say that a statement is true, is to say that it "states a 
fact about reality" (p. 36). Given this definition of truth, Runzo can argue for 
the relativity of truth by arguing the relativity of the real-these two relativisms 
entail one another. There is, on this view, no one "way the world is"; the range 
of possible constituents of one's world is determined by one's conceptual schema, 
and there can be more than one adequate (pragmatically expedient) schema. This 
"Pluralist Ontology Principle," as Runzo dubs it, does not reduce to saying that 
the world can be represented in whatever way we choose. A conceptual schema 
deternlines the ways things could be (i.e., a set of possible "world orders"). But 
the way things are, for those who share that schema, is determined by their 
conceptually structured interaction with mind-independent reality. Runzo, then, 
distinguishes a reality that is relative to conceptual schemas, viz., the phenomenal 
world, from a reality that is independent of all conceptual schemas and is variously 
repres{~nted by them, viz., noumenal reality (e.g., p. 60). 
Conceptual schemas can differ in two ways. First, they can include different 
categories of things among the possible constituents of their worlds. Second, 
they can affirm incompatible properties of the same entities, so that a proposition 
that is true in one conceptual schema may be false in another (p. 54). It is this 
result, of course, that stimulates the charge that conceptual relativism leads to 
subjectivism and skepticism. Runzo responds to the charge of subjectivism by 
insisting that conceptual schemas are shared, social structures which cannot be 
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adopted or abandoned simply as a matter of private choice. The worry about 
skepticism is more complex. Runzo seems to be principally concerned with the 
suggestion that if a single religious claim can have different truth values in 
different conceptual schemas, then we cannot be confident about its truth value 
at all (pp. 16, 182). "Since religious beliefs, if true, will be conceptual-schema-
relative true, no particular set of religious beliefs will have any more claim to 
an individual's adherence than any other, opposing set of beliefs" (p. 214). 
Runzo offers a list of six reasons why his conceptual relativism need not lead 
to skepticism (pp. 214ff), but he never gives what would appear to be the first 
and most effective reply, namely, that the skeptical maneuver begs the question. 
The skeptical reductio assumes that we can know the truth value of a proposition 
only if that truth value is universal, i.e., if it is the same for all knowers, whatever 
their epistemic circumstances. But that is precisely what Runzo's relativism 
denies; two different conceptual schemas can generate contrary truth values for 
a single proposition that occurs in each. It does not follow from this that persons 
who operate in terms of one of these schemas have no more reason to affirm 
than to deny the proposition in question. Within each schema, there is (ex 
hypothesi) epistemic justification for a particular judgment and this judgement 
conforms to the facts (i.e., in the world-order articulated by one conceptual 
schema the proposition is true and in the other it is false). The nagging sense 
that this leaves us without really knowing the truth value of the proposition gains 
its intuitive appeal from the law of the excluded middle. The proposition, we 
want to say, must be either true or false; if we find ourselves getting both results, 
then we just do not know its truth value. But this takes a logical rule that applies 
within every conceptual schema and applies it across schemas, claiming that a 
proposition must have the same truth value in every schema in which it appears. 
And this is more than a logical point; it is to reject ontological pluralism and 
insist that truth must be one. 
The relativist has a ready response, then, to the charge of skepticism about 
the truth values of first order propositions. But this response lays bare two more 
troublesome questions: 1) what reason there is to think that there are or could 
be multiple conceptual schemas, and 2) what possibility is there of rational 
adjudication of disputes between competing conceptual schemas? Runzo has 
relatively little to say about the first of these questions. He tells us that the crucial 
principle of ontological pluralism cannot be firmly established, only advanced 
as plausible (p. 37). He also comments briefly on Davidson's challenge to the 
idea of a conceptual scheme, and he notes the problem of individuating conceptual 
schemas. The latter dogs his discussion; his examples of alternative conceptual 
schemas include competing theories within the natural sciences, opposed 
naturalistic and theistic belief systems, divergent systematic theological positions, 
and different world religions. In all this he provides little guidance in determining 
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when a disagreement involves competing claims within a conceptual schema and 
when it involves a difference between conceptual schemas themselves. These 
difficulties are not unique to Runzo's discussion; they reflect an elusive abstract-
ness endemic to talk about alternative conceptual schemas. 
Most of Runzo's attention is given to the second question, and he presumes 
that in answering it he is addressing the problem of skepticism. But that is a 
mistake if, as I have suggested, the challenge of skepticism is best answered 
(on his own terms) by discussing the justification of knowledge claims within 
conceptual schemas. When the problem is addressed as a matter of explaining 
rational choice between conceptual schemas, then there is a powerful tendency 
to talk as though we could assess conceptual schemas by a single set of universal 
criteria and to suppose that those schemas which better satisfy these criteria 
correspond more exactly to reality. Any such notion of correspondence, however, 
is incompatible with the ontological pluralism essential to conceptual relativism. 
Runzo is aware of these hazards, but he falls prey to them nonetheless. He 
points out that there can be no question of choosing between entire conceptual 
schemas, but only of criticizing and revising parts of one's web of beliefs (p. 
218). Yet he speaks of "interschematic rational checking procedures" and of 
"trans-schema pragmatic criteria" that must be employed if our commitment to 
a conceptual schema is to be "objective" (pp. 214ff). Runzo has already argued 
that certain basic logical rules, like the principle of noncontradiction, should be 
regarded as "absolute truths" which place limits upon what can be said in any 
conceptual schema. It is much more problematic, however, to suggest that there 
are universal pragmatic criteria for assessing conceptual schemas. Runzo's own 
relativistic principles would seem to suggest that pragmatic criteria will be crea-
tures of particular conceptual schemas--different schemas presumably are rooted 
in patterns of life governed by different practical concerns. If, however, these 
criteria are genuinely trans-schematic, then he will be able to sustain his relativism 
only if more than one conceptual schema can adequately satisfy them. But then 
he will not be able to appeal to these criteria in justifying our commitment to 
one of these conceptual schemas rather than another. 
Runzo, in fact, goes in both directions here. On the one hand, he clearly 
maintains that there is an irreducible plurality of "basically adequate" conceptual 
schemas. On the other hand, he asks whether what we say about phenomenal 
reality is true of noumenal reality, and he proposes that "our schemas will provide 
better guidance-that is, be more pragmatically expedient-as they more accu-
rately correspond to noumenal reality" (p. 246). But this question should never 
arise, on Runzo's account. For the truth about noumenal reality can only be 
what is true within one or another conceptual schema. To talk this way of 
pragmatic criteria that offer tests for correspondence to noumenal reality is to 
suppose that there is a truth about noumenal reality (a way things really are) 
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independent of any conceptual schema. And that is to abandon conceptual 
relativism. 
After all his careful effort in defining conceptual relativism, Runzo is led into 
these difficulties by his concern first, to offer a defense of the "objectivity" of 
a theistic conceptual schema and, second, to provide some assurance to the theist 
that talk about God correctly refers to a reality ("God in Himself') that "lies 
behind" the theistic schema (p. 252). The latter concern leads him to wonder 
about the adequacy of the "phenomenal God" of our conceptual schemas to the 
noumenal God, and this question brings with it the collapse of his relativism. 
The need to raise this kind of question points to something important in theism, 
viz., its insistence that what is real and what is true are not in fact variables that 
can take different values, but rather are fixed in their values by God. It seems 
to follow from the basic claim that God is creator that there is in fact a "way 
things are": viz., the way they are for God. Theism, then, both radically relativizes 
all human conceptual schemas (by insisting upon their partiality) and resists a 
thorough-going relativism (by insisting that truth is one for God). It may be that 
theism is (or is part of) a conceptual schema and that there are alternative 
conceptual schemas in which the concept of God does not occur or in which 
important propositions about God have different truth values. But in a conceptual 
schema that makes it possible to speak of God as creator, it would appear that 
there will be intra-schematic reasons to deny relativism. If this is correct, then 
the problem about God and relativism is not principally that of whether one can 
sustain an "absolute faith" in the face of the plurality of truth. 
There is much in this book on which I have not commented. Runzo' s discussion 
of the conceptual formation of religious experience and his account of the nature 
of faith deserve careful attention in their own right. The argument of this book 
is rich in detail and bold in conception, and helps to draw a crucial set of issues 
into sharper focus. 
Predestination and Free Will: Four Views of Divine Sovereignty and Human 
Freedom, by David Basinger and Randall Basinger, eds. Downers Grove: 
Intervarsity Press, 1986. 180 pp. $6.95. 
Reviewed by DEWEY J. HOITENGA, JR., Grand Valley State University. 
The problem of divine sovereignty and human free will has to be one of the 
most intractable problems of Christian theology. Although this thesis is not their 
thesis, David and Randall Basinger have given us a book which confirms it 
nevertheless. The four views they present reduce to two: John Feinberg and 
Norman Geisler defend the view which the editors call "specific sovereignty," 
